Analytical causation in Islamic philosophy

Abstract

Analytical causation is a type of causation that is often overlooked in philosophical textbooks. This type of causation is contrasted with external causation. In modern times, contemporary philosophers have made efforts to show the importance of this category of causation. Nevertheless, there are many ambiguities surrounding the nature of this type of causation that must be removed before it can find its proper place in Islamic philosophy. First of all, the nature of this category of causation must be determined. In order to accomplish this, the terms concept, meaning, instance and individual should be defined. The clarification of these terms shows that philosophy is essentially concerned with meaning. Secondly, it must be shown how one thing can be the instance of numerous concepts and meanings without any contradiction arising. These two premises can help clarify how analytical causation is not philosophically problematic; rather, it is imperative and necessary. Historically speaking, Islamic philosophers never explicitly mentioned analytical causation as a separate type of causation. Nevertheless, in many places, they used the term causation to refer to cases where there is no external existential distinction between a cause and its effect. Muslim philosophers unanimously agree upon the principle that states that there is no mutual concomitance without causation. Based upon this principle, it is possible to demonstrate that there is causation between things that do not possess external existential distinction with one another but that mutually necessitate one another, such as existence and quiddity, two essentially necessary beings (such as the names of God and His essence) and two essentially impossible beings (such as a vicious circle and the priority of something over itself). This in turn shows the possibility of analytical causation. Another important discussion related to the subject of analytical causation is the differences between analytical and external causation. Although these two categories of causation have properties in common, there are also some fundamental distinctions between them. By way of example, in analytical causation, causation is a secondary intelligible. This is why it is a primary intelligible in external causation. What is more, in analytical causation, cause and effect are not instances of contraries. There are other distinctions between analytical and external causation. These and other important aspects of this discussion will be examined in this paper.