Analysis on competition strategy and regulatory strategy of international river water resources system – with the participation of co-operational agencies

Abstract

Abstract In order to reasonably allocate water resources, meet the water demand of water users, and solve the frequent conflicts of water resources in international rivers, this paper explores the optimal regulation strategy of water resources with the participation of co-operational agency based on game model. Our results show that: for water users, the regulatory strategy of co-operational agencies affects the competition of water users, and the competition strategies among water users also affect each other. The economic benefits of water resources, water withdrawal costs, fine and honor value all affect the water resources competition strategy of water users. For co-operational agencies, the competition strategy of water users affects the regulatory strategy of co-operational agencies. The intensity of penalization and the regulatory cost have an impact on the regulatory strategy of co-operational agencies, but the amount of operation funds of co-operational agencies does not affect its regulatory strategy. The research shows the water resources game process of international rivers with the participation of co-operational agencies, and provides some insights for the water resources regulation of international rivers.