Abstract
The emergence of conflicts between environmental safety incidents and protection rights generates sizeable political costs, which endangers the legitimacy of the government as well as political security and stability. This article further examines the role of political costs in environmental issues. First, political costs in relation to environmental issues are defined. An equilibrium strategic analysis is then presented using an evolutionary game model in which the strategic behavioral choices of government, enterprises, and citizens are investigated by embedding political costs in the environmental governance system. Furthermore, the small‐signal model was innovatively applied to simulate and analyze the stability of political costs under different equilibrium strategies in the system. The results show the following. (1) Pubic behavior and government are the dominant factors that impact stability and instability, respectively. Public behavior is the core element that affects political cost consumption. (2) When political costs are extremely depleted, the public will neglect economic interests, turn toward environmental interests, and choose the negative participation strategy, which destabilizes the system. (3) The political cost signal at the optimal equilibrium point not only warns the government not to take the desperate action of concealing information asymmetry but also allows the government to let go of its hands to deal with the environmental issues. Corresponding policy recommendations are proposed.
Highlights
Considering the advancement of industrialization, environmental pollution is becoming increasingly more serious due to rapid economic development and urbanization [1]
(2) When political costs are extremely depleted, the public will neglect economic interests, turn toward environmental interests, and choose the negative participation strategy, which destabilizes the system. (3) e political cost signal at the optimal equilibrium point warns the government not to take the desperate action of concealing information asymmetry and allows the government to let go of its hands to deal with the environmental issues
In the meantime, using game equilibrium analysis, small-signal model analysis, and numerical simulation technology, this paper carried out an equilibrium analysis of each equilibrium point and determined the evolutionary mechanism of the political cost at each equilibrium point
Summary
Considering the advancement of industrialization, environmental pollution is becoming increasingly more serious due to rapid economic development and urbanization [1]. Is paper can help to improve the efficiency of environmental governance carried out by the government, realize the coordinated development of the social economy and the ecological environment, resolve local crises, and maintain the country’s political security and stability. It is of great theoretical significance and is of practical value as it contributes to broadening the research perspective that is adopted to explore environmental issues
Sign-in/Register to view highlights & summary Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
