Analysis of the Individualistic, Competitive and Cooperative Motives in Non-Zero-Sum Games

Abstract

According to Messick and McClintock (1968), differences in choice behavior of strategy games of the non-zero-sum type may be explained mainly by three motives: the individualistic, the competitive, and the cooperative. The researchers' operational definitions of the motives are based on the payoffs in the game matrices. This article critically examines Messick and Mc-Clintock's expositions and demonstrates that the payoff consideration cannot be the sole criterion for the identification of motivational goals. Disregarding the opponent's choice may lead to mistaken conclusions concerning the participant's motive as inferred from his decision. In the wake of this oversight, the proposal for measuring the three motives, stated in this article, is based on the following principles: (1) A pre-programmed plan for one participant in the game in order to standardize the situation the subjects face. (2) A large number of trials in order to ensure the subject's awareness of the opponent's fixed strategy. (3) The combination of 1 and 2 with appropriate payoff values enables the construction of the conflict situation confronting the subject.