Analysis of the evolutionary game between maritime regulators and carriers under the discharge of ballast nuclear wastewater from ships

Abstract

The Japanese government officially announced the discharge of Fukushima nuclear wastewater into the sea on April 13, 2021, which has caused concern and strong opposition from countries worldwide and international environmental organizations. Through the analysis of relevant data, it is found that the hazards of ship ballast nuclear wastewater are reflected in the following: ship ballast water flows widely, the high discharge of ship ballast water, and the high reserves of Fukushima nuclear wastewater. In this case, the evolutionary game models of the maritime regulator and the carrier, and the society, maritime regulator and the carrier were constructed, respectively. In the evolutionary game model between the maritime regulator and the carrier, the carrier is not very motivated to deal with the ship's ballast water due to the influence of several related factors, especially the exorbitant treatment cost. After introducing the social supervision and reward system, maritime regulators found that controlling their own supervision cost and giving appropriate rewards to freighters with the participation of social supervision can effectively improve the motivation of freighters to deal with the ship's ballast water. In addition, through the comparative analysis of the before-and-after game model, it is found that the high cost required by the carriers to deal with ships' ballast water will directly affect the stable state that the game model tends to be. Therefore, the sustainable growth of the port's ecological environment benefits from pursuing affordable and effective ship's ballast water treatment.