Abstract

The healthcare IoT system is considered to be a significant and modern medical system. There is broad consensus that these systems will play a vital role in the achievement of economic growth in numerous growth countries. Among the major challenges preventing the fast and widespread adoption of such systems is the failure to maintain the data privacy of patients and the integrity of remote clinical diagnostics. Recently, the author proposed an end-to-end authentication scheme for healthcare IoT systems (E2EA), to provide a mutual authentication with a high data rate between the communication nodes of the healthcare IoT systems. Although the E2EA authentication scheme supports numerous attractive security services to resist various types of attack, there is an ambiguous view of the impact of the desynchronization attack on the E2EA authentication scheme. In general, the performance of the authentication scheme is considered a critical issue when evaluating the applicability of such schemes, along with the security services that can be achieved. Therefore, this paper discusses how the E2EA authentication scheme can resist the desynchronization attack through all possible attack scenarios. Additionally, the effect of the desynchronization attack on the E2EA scheme performance is analyzed in terms of its computation and communication costs, based on a comparison with the recently related authentication schemes that can prevent such attack. Moreover, this research paper finds that the E2EA authentication scheme can not only prevent the desynchronization attack, but also offers a low cost in terms of computations and communications, and can maintain consistency and synchronization between the communication nodes of the healthcare IoT systems during the next authentication sessions.

Highlights

  • The healthcare IoT system is one of the most important medical systems

  • This research paper finds that the E2EA authentication scheme can prevent the desynchronization attack, and offers a low cost in terms of computations and communications, and can maintain consistency and synchronization between the communication nodes of the healthcare IoT systems during the authentication sessions

  • E2EA authentication scheme is executed between four authentication entities: the physician node (Pi) represents the professional doctor, the gateway node (GWN) node represents the healthcare service provider, the smart device node (SDj) represents the participant’s patient, and the wireless medical sensor network technology (WMSN) node (Sk) represents the sensors that will collect the patient’s vital signs and be accessed by the physician

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Summary

Introduction

The healthcare IoT system is one of the most important medical systems. There is a broad consensus that these systems will play an essential function in achieving economic growth for several growth countries in terms of the health of their societies [1,2,3,4]. With the growing demand for healthcare IoT systems, many healthcare IoT authentication schemes have been proposed to resolve the security weaknesses and to prevent different types of attack that target the patient’s privacy and the integrity of remote clinical diagnostics [12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20]. These attacks can be summarized as the password table attack, man-in-the-middle attack, wrong login information attack, replay attack, impersonate attack, insider attack, smart card loss attack, and desynchronization attack [21,22,23,24,25].

Review of E2EA Authentication Scheme
Physician Registration Stage
Patient Registration Stage
WMSN Node Registration Stage
Short-Term Authentication Stage
WMSN Node Authentication Stage
Attack Scenarios of Short-Term Authentication Stage
Performance Analysis
Computation Cost Analysis
Communication Costs Analysis
Conclusion
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