Analysis of the compound differential evolution game of new energy manufacturers’ two-stage market behavior under the weight of consumption responsibility

Abstract

To promote renewable energy consumption and achieve China's low-carbon energy transition, in 2019, China proposed the weight of consumption responsibility (WCR) for renewable energy in each province. This study aims to explore the micro-market behavior of new energy manufacturers in the context of WCR policy. A two-market bidding model for new energy manufacturers is first proposed, and a two-stage compound differential evolutionary game algorithm is proposed for solving the multi-party game problem. By selecting typical electricity demand scenarios, the evolution of new energy manufacturers' strategies in the electricity market and green certificate market as well as under different WCR and different thermal power unit parameters are analyzed. The research results show that when the non-hydropower WCR is relatively low, new energy manufacturers tend to adopt a low-price strategy for generation quotation and a low volume high price strategy for green certificate sales. Other conditions being unchanged, with the increase in non-hydropower WCR, all new energy manufacturers will still adopt a low-price strategy in the electricity market. New energy manufacturers with high installed capacity will increase progressively their certificate quotation. The higher output lower limit for thermal units is not conducive to electricity market bidding by new energy manufacturers.