Analysis of strategic customer behavior in observable M/G/1 queues with impatience

Abstract

ABSTRACT In this paper, we propose a queueing-game-theoretic model and analyze the strategic behavior of customers and social optimization in an observable M / G / 1 queue, in which arriving customers decide whether to join the system or balk based on a new binary and random reward-cost structure. Each incoming customer to the queue has a relative tolerance time. If the customer’s service does not begin (or end) within his or her relative tolerance time, the customer will incur a cost for his or her waiting. We first derive closed-form solutions for customers’ equilibrium and socially optimal joining strategies using the technique of the Laplace-Stieltjes transform. Furthermore, some representative numerical experiments are performed to visualize the theoretical results. The numerical scenarios illustrate the influence of the relative tolerance time on equilibrium strategy and socially optimal strategy. Finally, we compare the effect of relative tolerance time on social welfare in observable and unobservable queues. The numerical results show that observable queues lead to higher social welfare. This study provides guidance for system providers in designing more economical and sustainable public service systems.