Analysis of Pricing and Service Effort in Dual-Channel Supply Chains with Showrooming Effect

Abstract

Showrooming has become common practice of consumers in the context of dual-channel retailing. Under different intensities of showrooming, the manufacturer can decide whether to directly retail online (the M-R case) or resell through an e-retailer (the E-R case). Dual-channel supply chain models and dynamic game models are developed and both online selling formats are investigated. The dynamic game process of the supply chain is numerically simulated. The stability of the Nash equilibrium point is investigated by parameter basins for periodical cycles and bifurcation diagrams. The results show that the price adjustment speeds have a larger stability range in the M-R case while the service effort adjustment speed has a larger stability range in the E-R case. The stability of the systems is more sensitive to price adjustment speed than service effort adjustment speed in both supply chain structures. It is found that the systems will enter chaos through a flip bifurcation or a Neimark–Sacker bifurcation. The changes in attractors and basins of attraction indicate that both channels can reach the equilibria more easily when they choose a lower speed of retail price adjustment. The effects of showrooming on decision variables are greater in the M-R case than in the E-R case. When the showrooming effect is moderate, the manufacturer should choose the M-R case; when the showrooming effect is sufficiently large or sufficiently small, the manufacturer should choose the E-R case. We propose a wholesale price markdown strategy which can: (i) eliminate the double marginalization and coordinate the supply chain; (ii) effectively control the chaos caused by the overhigh adjustment speed of wholesale price, and restore the system to a stable state; (iii) improve the retailer’s service effort.