Abstract

Considering public participation in environmental management, we developed a tripartite game model among governments, manufacturers and publics under carbon taxes and subsidies to investigate whether the mutual relationship between governments and the public can urge manufacturers to adopt low-carbon technology by examining the interaction effect among the multi-stakeholders. In this study, we focus on manufactured products without significant low-carbon peculiarity. For these products, consumers have no way to identify which are from low-carbon production and which are not. The results show that governments and the public have a complementary and coordinating relationship indeed. The regulation cost of governments, the supervision reward for the public and the supervision cost of the public can all influence the behavioral strategies among the multi-stakeholders, including governments, manufacturers and the public. With the regulation cost strengthens dramatically, governments can consider increasing the supervision reward to support the public to participate in the management of manufacturers’ behaviors. Publics should also actively improve their management ability, and the low cost of public participation in supervision is an effective reflection to make up for the lack of government regulation. The implementation of carbon taxes is more advantageous in urging low-carbon manufacturing than government subsidies for low-carbon production. A complete carbon label system can reflect the low-carbon preferences of consumers to help manufacturers integrate low-carbon behavior into their operational decisions.

Highlights

  • People have witnessed the fast growth of the world economy and the progress of science and technology, which is at the cost of severe environmental pollution and ecological damage

  • We focused on an in-depth analysis of the interaction mechanism among the government, manufacturers and publics—and we investigate whether the complementary relationship between government and public can help manufacturers to implement low-carbon strategies

  • Whether the environmental management participants are diverse or not, we should always adhere to the dominant position of governments, not to mention the responsibility of governments in the process of low-carbon development

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Summary

Introduction

People have witnessed the fast growth of the world economy and the progress of science and technology, which is at the cost of severe environmental pollution and ecological damage. Compared with various types of polluting industries, the original management system and policies of government have lagged behind the internal requirements of low-carbon development It will not effectively form a well binding force on some enterprises and organizations that are high emissions and pollution, nor will it effectively stimulate multi-agent to innovate technologies, promote energy conservation and emission reduction [7]. Public participation in environmental protection refers to the participation of individuals or third-party organizations outside the government in environmental decision-making and management through a series of formal and informal channels. They evaluate and supervise the environmental behaviors of governments and enterprises, or carry out environmental protection activities directly [8].

The Low-Carbon Policy on Enterprises’ Decision-Making
The Role of Public Participation in Environmental Protection
The Application of the Evolutionary Game
Model Assumption
Model Formulation
The Replicator Dynamic Behavior of Governments
The Replicator Dynamic Behavior of Manufacturers
Stability Analysis
Case and Parameters Setting
The Influence of Cr on Multi-Stakeholders’ Evolutionary Behavior
The Influence of R on Multi-Stakeholders’ Evolutionary Behavior
The Influence of Cs on Multi-Stakeholders’ Evolutionary Behavior
Findings
The Influence of T and S on Manufacturers’ Evolutionary Behavior
Conclusions and Policy Implications

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