Abstract
A common problem to current digital subscription services is how to prevent membership (e.g. account and password) sharing beyond authorised consumers. Unlike traditional subscription services such as wired phone examples, sharing is much more popular in a digital world due to the access of information goods is typically portable and the identifications can be easily transferred. In this article, we first present a formal game-theoretic analysis of the sharing problem, and then propose an incentives-based secrets protection system (IBSPS) so as to encourage consumers to keep their memberships private rather than to share them among friends. The analysis on user's behaviour and producer's revenue management with IBSPS is presented so as to achieve a win-win game between them. Finally, a proposal on conjoint analysis of user behaviours is presented to further verify the effectiveness and efficiency hypotheses of IBSPS.
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
