Abstract

The average economic growth rate of Pasaman Regency before the administrative division (1993-2002) was 5.8%, then after the division increased slightly to an average of 5.9%. This figure is far lower than the rate of growth of the New Autonomous Region of West Pasaman Regency (6.4 %). After the division, agricultural and mining sectors became more dominant in the economy of Pasaman making up 54.6% but the contribution of the manufacturing sector declined sharply from 10.3% to 4.6% as most of the existing Pasaman processing industry became part of West Pasaman. The comparative advantages of Pasaman Regency are mainly in the sectors: agriculture, forestry and freshwater fisheries. The district’s economic growth is mainly influenced by factors originating from outside the region as indicated by the relatively high regional-share component of 159%. While regional division has benefited West Pasaman, it has provided no significant benefit for the parent region which can still be categorized as underdeveloped. An analysis of the Klassen Typology Matrix indicates that policies and programs that are relevant for the development of disadvantaged areas should be directed at providing employment through the use of labor-intensive technologies. This development should focus on agriculture, forestry and freshwater fisheries producing products with a significantly extensive market.

Highlights

  • The connection between decentralisation and corruption has recently been discussed among researchers, policy makers, and the public

  • Community and ecologically based legal reform (HUMA) indicates that Law Number 41 of 1999 concerning forestry contains some weaknesses: (a) ambiguity, vagueness regarding rights and obligations, and a lack of security in forest management; (b) reduced public access to the forest; (c) an imbalanced allocation of funds for the forests managed by the public, private corporations and the government; and (d) overlaps in area status (Arizona, 2008)

  • The concurrent government within the regional authority is further divided into 2 categories which is reflected in Article 11 Paragraph (1), namely: compulsory government5 and elective government

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Summary

Introduction

The connection between decentralisation and corruption has recently been discussed among researchers, policy makers, and the public. 3. In a budget proposal for the procurement of an integrated radio communication system by the Ministry of Forestry from 2007 – 2008, some amount of money was given to the members of commission IV of the House of Representatives and to officials of the Forest Department. 5. The Regent of Siak issued business permits to several companies for the utilisation of wood products from a forest plantation from 2001 – 2003 in the Regency of Siak. A business permit was issued to 9 companies in the Province of Riau for the utilisation of wood products from a forest plantation. Regional governments argue that the wood produced by the forests can provide more regional revenue, a statement that supports decentralisation This assumption by the state leads to the issuance of permits for logging, which certainly leads to more extensive deforestation (Siswanto and Wardojo, 2006).

Securing Forest Management by Adat
Adat Community of Badui
Adat Community of Ammatoa
Forest Management by the Central Government and Regional Governments
Decentralisation Issues and Corruption in the Forestry Sector
Bribing people responsible for monitoring
Eradicating Ecology-Damaging Corruption in the Decentralisation Era
Solidifying the Structure of law Enforcement
Strengthening the Participation of the Public
Findings
Conclusion
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