Abstract
Based on the perspective of ecological compensation and ecological claims, this paper analyzes the stability of Beijing Tianjin Hebei haze governance alliance by using asymmetric evolutionary game model, and obtains the optimal strategy combination. The results show that: a reasonable ecological compensation standard is very important for enterprises to adopt energy-saving and emission reduction strategies. Only when the total value of ecological claims in the two places is higher than the cost of energy-saving and emission reduction, enterprises will adopt energy-saving and emission reduction strategies, and the implementation of energy-saving and emission reduction strategies will not be shaken by the amount of ecological compensation.
Highlights
The haze problem in Beijing, Tianjin and Hebei and its surrounding areas is becoming increasingly serious
R is the original income of the enterprises in the two places before they do not implement the policy, C is the cost of implementing the policy, S is the loss of the Beijing government when the enterprises in the two places do not implement the policy, P is the ecological compensation of the Beijing government to the enterprises in Tianjin and Hebei under the intervention policy, A1 is the ecological claim of the local government when the enterprises in the two places do not implement the policy, A2 is the ecological compensation of the Beijing government when the enterprises in the two places do not implement the policy Claim, the above parameters are greater than 0
The laissez faire policy assumes that x is the proportion of enterprises that implement Beijing government's ecological compensation and ecological claim policies, 1-x is the proportion of enterprises that do not implement the policies; Suppose y is the proportion of Beijing government's intervention policy, 1-y is the proportion of Beijing government's laissez faire policy
Summary
The haze problem in Beijing, Tianjin and Hebei and its surrounding areas is becoming increasingly serious. The key of haze governance lies in the environmental governance of Beijing, Tianjin and Hebei, and the key of environmental governance lies in whether the energy conservation and emission reduction work of relevant enterprises in Tianjin and Hebei is in place. The literature about haze collaborative governance mainly focuses on policy, law and game theory. Based on the game theory, Xue Jian[5] gives the cost sharing of air pollution control among Beijing, Tianjin and Hebei, and Bai Liyuan[6] designs the game model of central, local and enterprises to analyze the haze control. Based on the perspective of ecological compensation and ecological claims, this paper takes Beijing Tianjin Hebei haze governance as the research object, analyzes the stability of Beijing Tianjin Hebei haze governance alliance by using asymmetric evolutionary game model, and obtains the optimal strategy combination
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