Abstract
The goal of the paper is to reply to David Duarte’s critique of the partial reducibility thesis―a claim I defended in one of my books that analogy is partly reducible to the balancing of legal principles. In the first part of the paper I sketch the framework against which the thesis was formulated, i.e. Robert Alexy’s theory of legal reasoning. In the second part I attempt to rebut Duarte’s objections, pointing out that they do not take into account the Alexian background of my considerations. Finally, I suggest that some aspects of my theory of analogical reasoning are independent of its theoretical background and may be of value for any conceptualization of analogy in the law.
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