Abstract

AbstractDespite its importance in various fields, analogical reasoning has not yet received a unified formal representation. Our contribution proposes a general scheme of inference that is compatible with different types of logic (deductive, probabilistic, non-monotonic). Firstly, analogical assessment precisely defines the similarity of two objects according to their properties, in a relative rather than absolute way. Secondly, analogical inference transfers a new property from one object to a similar one, thanks to an over-hypothesis linking two sets of properties. The belief strength in the conclusion is then directly related to the belief strength in this meta-hypothesis.

Highlights

  • Reasoning by analogy is a very usual mode of reasoning, explicit or implicit in epistemic practice

  • We make explicit the difference and complementarity between the concept of analogical statement, which merely states that two objects have a relevant similarity, and the concept of analogical inference, which relies on the former in order to draw a conclusion from some premises

  • Our paper follows the same goal of clarification and shares the importance of the vertical relations between the properties of the objects but departs largely from Bartha’s paper: the paper assumes that reasoning by analogy obeys the same syntactical principles whatever its field of application or its function

Read more

Summary

Introduction

Reasoning by analogy is a very usual mode of reasoning, explicit or implicit in epistemic practice. Our paper follows the same goal of clarification and shares the importance of the vertical relations between the properties of the objects but departs largely from Bartha’s paper: the paper assumes that reasoning by analogy obeys the same syntactical principles whatever its field of application or its function These principles will be expressed in a formal way by avoiding as much as possible all ill-defined or ambiguous concepts The idea of non-redundancy is the starting point of Davies & Russel (1987), who proposed an analysis of analogical reasoning based on “determination rules”, linking the shared properties and the projected properties of the analogous objects It results in a deductive account of analogical reasoning. Some conclusions about the specificity of our approach are sketched and some insights for future analysis are suggested (§6)

General framework
Absolute analogy
Relative analogy
The general inference scheme
Structure of the background hypothesis in a deductive framework
Probabilistic over-hypothesis
Comparison with single-case induction
Comparison with some logical and AI works
Conclusion

Talk to us

Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have

Schedule a call

Disclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.