An Overview of Content Poisoning in NDN: Attacks, Countermeasures, and Direction

Abstract

With a huge demand for replicated content on the Internet, a new networking paradigm called information-centric networking (ICN) has been introduced for efficient content dissemination. In ICN, named content is distributed over the network cache and it is accessed by name instead of a location identifier. These aspects allow users to retrieve content from any of the nodes having replicas, and consequently 1) network resources are more efficiently utilized by avoiding redundant transmission and 2) more scalable services are provided by distributing server loads. However, in-network caching in ICN brings about a new type of security issues, called content poisoning attacks, where fabricated content is located in the network cache and interferes with the normal behavior of the system. In this paper, we look into the problems of content poisoning in ICN and discuss security architectures against them. In particular, we reconsider the state-of-the-art schemes from the perspective of feasibility, and propose a practical security architecture.