An Objectivist Critique of Relativism in Mathematics Education

Abstract

Many constructivists tag as `absolutist' references to mathematics as an abstract body of knowledge, and stake-out the moral high-ground with the argument that mathematics is not only utilised oppressively but that mathematics is, in-itself, oppressive. With much reference to Ernest's (1991) Philosophy of Mathematics Education this tag has been justified on the grounds that if mathematics is a social-cultural creation that is mutable and fallible then it must be social acceptance that confers the objectivity of mathematics. This paper argues that mathematics, albeit a social-cultural creation that is mutable and fallible, is a body of knowledge the objectivity of which is independent of origin or social acceptance. Recently, Ernest (1998) has attempted to express social constructivism as a philosophy of mathematics and has included the category of logical necessity in his elaboration of the objectivity of mathematics. We argue that this inclusion of logical necessity not only represents a U-turn, but that the way in which Ernest has included this category is an attempt to maintain his earlier position that it is social acceptance that confers the objectivity of mathematics.