An IUR evolutionary game model on the patent cooperate of Shandong China

Abstract

Organizations of industries and university & research institutes cooperate to meet their respective needs based on social contacts, trust and share complementary resources. From the perspective of complex network together with the patent data of Shandong province in China, a novel evolutionary game model on patent cooperation network is presented. Two sides in the game model are industries and universities & research institutes respectively. The cooperation is represented by a connection when a new patent is developed together by the two sides. The optimal strategy of the evolutionary game model is quantified by the average positive cooperation probability p̄ and the average payoff Ū. The feasibility of this game model is simulated on the parameters such as the knowledge spillover, the punishment, the development cost and the distribution coefficient of the benefit. The numerical simulations show that the cooperative behaviors are affected by the variation of parameters. The knowledge spillover displays different behaviors when the punishment is larger than the development cost or less than it. Those results indicate that reasonable punishment would improve the positive cooperation. The appropriate punishment will be useful to enhance the big degree nodes positively cooperate with industries and universities & research institutes. And an equitable plan for the distribution of cooperative profits is half-and-half distribution strategy for the two sides in game.