An Intervener's Conduct: Humanitarian Intervention and Jus in Bello

Abstract

This chapter defends the moral importance of an intervener's fidelity to the principles to jus in bello (principles of just conduct in war). It begins by outlining the particular principles of ‘external jus in bello’ that an intervener should follow (focusing largely on discrimination and proportionality). It draws on Jeff McMahan's work and the nature of humanitarian intervention to claim that these principles should be highly restrictive. The chapter then asserts two principles of ‘internal jus in bello’. The second section considers more broadly the moral underpinnings of the principles of jus in bello. It claims that consequentialist justifications of these principles cannot fully grasp their moral significance and particularly the difference between doing and allowing. The final section considers the ‘Absolutist Challenge’—that the principles of jus in bello defended are too important and consequently render humanitarian intervention impermissible. After rejecting the doctrine of double effect as a solution to this challenge, the chapter invokes the scalar account of legitimacy to respond to this objection.