An Interpreter or two: defusing NATO’s Siberian pipeline dispute, 1981–1982

Abstract

For much of 1982, NATO was seen as an alliance in crisis once more. The introduction of martial law in Poland and the subsequent US decision to introduce sanctions created a considerable rift, as many of Washington’s partners resented the measures and the threat that these sanctions posed to the construct of a natural gas pipeline connecting Siberian energy reserves to consumers in Western Europe. Beset by problems, two of the Alliance’s members, the UK and Canada, saw a possible role as an intermediary between the two sides of the intra-alliance dispute. Both British and Canadian efforts to mediate the problem faced clear obstacles, but the fact that officials in London and in Ottawa saw a role for themselves as an interpreter sheds new light on the common assertion that the Siberian pipeline question divided the USA from its Western European allies. British and Canadian thinking reflected a paradox that, at once, viewed the transatlantic rift as one between the USA and the rest of the allies, while also seeing themselves as distinct from that binary.