Abstract
AbstractThis paper explores the fact that linear opinion pooling can be represented as a Bayesian update on the opinions of others. It uses this fact to propose a new interpretation of the pooling weights. Relative to certain modelling assumptions the weights can be equated with the so-called truth-conduciveness known from the context of Condorcet's jury theorem. This suggests a novel way to elicit the weights.
Highlights
Say that Raquel consults her peer Quassim about the proposition S
They show that certain constraints on the model suffice, and that we do not need to specify the Bayesian model in full detail to obtain an outcome in accordance with linear pooling
The approach of this paper differs from that of the afore-mentioned ones. It does not take a Bayesian model with some additional assumptions as starting point, to investigate if and when we arrive at some form of pooling
Summary
Say that Raquel consults her peer Quassim about the proposition S. Genest and Schervish (1985) consider a Bayesian model of a decision maker learning the opinion of an expert, and investigate when the result of the update coincides with a general version of the linear opinion pool. They show that certain constraints on the model suffice, and that we do not need to specify the Bayesian model in full detail to obtain an outcome in accordance with linear pooling. An important benefit of this interpretation is that it facilitates the empirical elicitation of weights
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