Abstract

Within the next future, the advent of Galileo, GPS modernization and of the GNSS augmentation systems, will lead to a rapid development of GNSS receiver technologies. It is expected that the improved accuracy performance will extend the use of satellite positioning and navigation to applications where present systems do not fulfill user integrity requirements and do not allow the receiver certification. In this scenario a central role is played by the integrity receiver capability. In fact a large part of users is carrying out applications in which an error in might represent an excessive risk, in particular when human lives are involved. For these applications, the system capability of protecting the user against system failure is of primary importance. The main example is given by aeronautical applications where at present the fulfillment of integrity requirements during approaches of type CAT I (and higher) has still to be reached. In this context, it is essential for the user to take advantage of Receiver Autonomous Integrity Monitoring (RAIM) techniques. In fact, although regional integrity is provided by space-based augmentation systems (SBAS) like EGNOS, WAAS and MSAS and global integrity will be transmitted by the European Galileo satellite navigation system in the near future, RAIM is the only technique able to monitor receiver local errors. Since it is located at the end of the integrity processing chain, its role is essential in the integrity determination process. It is also highlighted that present RAIM techniques have limitations, which in particular jeopardize the possibility to certificate satellite navigation receiver as sole or stand alone positioning platform in aeronautical applications. The main limitation is represented by the fact that all present RAIM techniques protect users only against one single failure affecting a particular satellite range measurement. Multiple failure events are usually assumed to have a very low probability of occurrence. But since in safety of life applications the continuity and availability requirements in terms of probability of missed detection are very strict, the multiple failure events need more attention and cannot be disregarded anymore by RAIM techniques. This paper presents an investigation on present RAIM technique and their performance with respect to multiple failures. Furthermore it presents a technique able to overcome the present integrity monitoring limitations and to protect the user receiver in case of multiple failures.

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