An Institutional History of the Fall and Rise of (In)Egalitarian Democracy: The Case of Argentina (1913-1999)

Abstract

In general, the literature on democratization and inequality emphasizes the idea that the adoption of a democratic regime brings voters who are below the national income average the incentive to voting for redistribution of income in their favor. However, it is worth mentioning that such an approach is usually based on events in developed countries. On average, these countries present particular models for moving through regimes of absolutist states and constitutional monarchies until, through popular pressure, they undergo a long and almost continuous process of democratization and an increase in the scope of the right to vote. This work analyzes the egalitarian aspect of democracy in the context of Latin American history (especially Argentina), given the political and institutional peculiarities of the region (clientelism, caudillo, slavery, and others). Argentina has undergone alternation between typically Latin American autocratic and democratic regimes (caudillismo, military regimes, populist and liberal democracies) and enjoys long-run database. The methodology to be adopted by the study follows a multi-method approach through quantitative (ARDL and Granger-causality) and qualitative (process tracing) methods. The results of the estimates indicate a long-term relationship between the democratization process in Argentina and the increase in income inequality. However, there is also an increase in the share of income distributed to workers. Qualitative historical work suggests that this relationship is due to the dispersion of wages caused by economic shocks and redistribution of income to the middle class for electoral purposes.