An Inquiry for an Institutional Arrangement to Govern the Space Commons

Abstract

Space debris can result a collective-action problem, and its existing population has already reached a 'tipping point.' Many efforts have been considered to control and reduce environmental degradation, such as the use of technological solutions like mitigation and remediation procedures, and a proposed International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities prescribing the 'rules of the road for space.’ However, these mechanisms lack the long-term aggressiveness to deal with the debris problem. An alternative strategy is required. This paper carries an inquiry whether the existing space governance regime can optimally manage and sustain safe access to and use of space, and address this collective-action problem. For this investigation, Elinor Ostrom’s framework for institutional analysis from her publication of Governing the Commons is used. It argues that such regulatory set-up is inherently inefficient to protect the orbits. The bifurcate nature of international space law, delegating responsibility for overseeing the space activities of governmental and non-governmental entities to nation-states with heterogeneity of interests and capabilities in the utilisation of space, significantly challenge the successful preservation of the Space Commons. This paper, accordingly, makes a case that a new governance regime is needed and, indeed, desirable for the sustainability and safety of space.