An Incomplete Revolution: Enhancing the Security Council’s Role in Enforcing Counterterrorism Obligations

Abstract

Since 9/11, international organizations have actively devised counterterrorism strategies and frameworks. Of particular interest are the contributions of the United Nations Security Council (SC), which are increasingly attracting scholarly attention. Through Resolutions 1368, 1373, and subsequent resolutions, the SC instituted a robust counterterrorism framework, an exercise that was in many ways revolutionary in scope. To date, considerable scholarly emphasis has been placed on the SC’s role as legislator, ie as creator of primary international counterterrorism obligations. However, insufficient attention is paid to the SC’s role as implementer of those legal norms, namely at the second stage of the inquiry when it is time to actually enforce obligations or settle disputes over the application of State responsibility (SR) norms. This article examines the largely unexplored role of SR, if any, in catalysing or informing the SC’s exercise of its powers when handling counterterrorism matters, whilst shedding light on the policy payoffs that could be derived from institutionalizing this normative scheme. Moving away from self-help remedies and unilateral countermeasures, I argue that SR for failing to prevent terrorism can be implemented by the SC in appropriate cases. In substantiating my claims, I draw heavily from relevant institutional and state practice. Ultimately, the picture that emerges is one where the SC can play a role, sometimes determinant, in applying SR norms, a prospect that may be a welcome alternative to unchecked unilateralism and constitute a desirable dispute settlement option in certain instances.