An Incentive Mechanism Design View in Hybrid Access Control in Small Cell Networks

Abstract

In this paper, we investigate the hybrid access control in two-tier small cell networks from the perspective of incentive mechanism design, considering macro base station's private information. We formulate this problem as a Stackelberg game. To be specific, the macro base station (MBS) and small cell base stations (SBSs) are modeled as a leader with specific payoff preference and followers, respectively. A subsidy mechanism is adopted by MBS. Only when the SBS can provide acceptable service level for macro user (MUE), then MBS handovers MUE to SBS and provides subsidy to SBS; otherwise, MBS serves MUE by itself. We consider the impacts of MBS's private information on the final equilibrium of the proposed game. Theoretical analysis and simulation results show it is better for MBS to broadcast the private information to get more payoff from the perspective of incentive mechanism design.