An Incentive Mechanism Based on Bertrand Game for Opportunistic Edge Computing

Qinghua Li,Qing Wu,Feng Zeng,Junjie Yang

doi:10.1109/access.2020.3046634

Qinghua Li, Qing Wu + Show 2 more

Open Access

https://doi.org/10.1109/access.2020.3046634

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Abstract

In a real edge network, many nodes may be selfish and unwilling to forward messages for other nodes. In this case, an incentive mechanism is needed to encourage the selfish nodes to participate in message forwarding. In this paper, we analyze the interaction between the source node and the relay node in edge opportunistic networks, and propose an incentive mechanism based on game theory to encourage the cooperation between nodes. Firstly, we define the interaction steps between the source and the relay node, which include that the source node decides the price of forwarding a message, the relay node responses the forwarding plan to the source node, and all nodes can get reward for their participant in message forwarding. We provide two-stage incentives to nodes, that is, the nodes can get reward from both receiving and forwarding messages. Since the nodes may be selfish, both the source node and the relay node want to maximize their utilities. Then, we model the cooperation between the source and the relay node as Bertrand Game, and the utility functions of the source and the relay node are defined. Furthermore, we find that the Nash Equilibrium is existed and unique, and present the best pricing scheme for the source node and the best forwarding plan for the relay node. The simulation results show that the proposed incentive mechanism can encourage the cooperation between selfish nodes, and improve the performance of routing algorithm in terms of delivery ratio and delay.

Highlights

With the development of mobile terminals and wireless technology, the Opportunistic Edge Network[1] is increasingly becoming the hot research topic
To the relay node, its reward for receiving a message directly comes from the source node
In this paper, we define the interaction steps between the source and the relay node, in which the source decides the price for the relay node to forward a message, and based on the given price, the relay node decides the number of the message to be forwarded

Summary

INTRODUCTION

With the development of mobile terminals and wireless technology, the Opportunistic Edge Network[1] is increasingly becoming the hot research topic. In traditional wireless ad hoc networks, it is required for data transmission that at least one complete communication link is existed between the source and destination node. Different from the traditional network, it does not need a complete link between the source and the destination in an opportunistic edge network, and forwarding messages between nodes are usually opportunistic and based on the movement of nodes[3]. As we can find from the routing scheme in opportunistic edge networks, there may be many nodes taking part in the communication between the source and the destination, and the success of data transmission is based on the cooperation among nodes[4]. The work in this paper promotes the enthusiasm of nodes to participate in message forwarding, and has the performance of data transmission improved.

RELATED WORK

PRICING ANALYSIS BASED ON GAME THEORY

SIMULATIONS

Findings

CONCLUSIONS