Abstract
AbstractThis paper extends recent results on an incentive‐compatible modification of the Heal algorithm for resource allocation. Previous research has shown, under some assumptions, that the participants can be induced to report the truth in their own interest so as to achieve a group optimum. Using the same modified procedure, we show that if we allow secret collusion among users, participants can be induced to report quasi‐accurate information in their own interest so as to achieve a group optimum. The instantaneous convergence rate (in terms of a Lyapunov function) is faster when we allow collusion.
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