Abstract
The paradox between idle homesteads in rural areas and the shortage of construction land in urban areas is concerning. Hence, local governments encourage farmers to reclaim their idle homesteads and farmlands to generate quota. However, the current quota price, which is based on the land reclamation cost, is often inadequate to motivate farmers. This study proposed that the construction land quota and construction land are complementary items, and hence, their pricing should be studied simultaneously instead of independently. Therefore, the classical sequential auction model with complementarity was improved using the core characteristics of quota transactions and those were applied to design optimal pricing mechanisms. Subsequently, the influence of relevant factors on the bidding price was analysed. The results indicated that the bidding price decreases with an increase in the number of bidders and that a bidder’s revenue is at a loss when they acquire the quota but fail to obtain the land; hence, the revenue probability is lost. However, bidding prices increase when the fine of delaying construction increases. To raise the quota price and encourage relatively more farmers to reclaim their idle homesteads, local governments should appropriately increase the delaying construction fines or repurchase the quota at a premium from the bidder who acquires the quota but fails to obtain the land, which is beneficial for easing conflict between construction land demands and farmland protection and for promoting the sustainable development of China’s social economy.
Highlights
Since the implementation of the Open and Reform Policy of 1978 in China, urbanisation has occurred at an unprecedented rate, increasing from 17.88% in 1978 to 59.58% in 2018 [1]
In response to the pressure of farmland protection, while simultaneously providing space for urbanisation, Chinese government has implemented annual longterm plans to impose a strict control over the quota allocated to local governments, for converting the farmland into construction use land [5, 6]
The farmers’ expected income increases with the increase in the fine on delaying construction and decreases with the increase in the revenue loss of bidders losing during the second stage (Figs 5 and 6) because the equilibrium bidding price of the construction land quota increases and decreases with the increase in the fine and revenue loss, respectively, that is, the fine of delaying construction and repurchasing the quota at a premium from the bidder who acquires the quota but fails to obtain the land set by local governments indirectly affects the income of farmers who reclaim idle homesteads
Summary
Since the implementation of the Open and Reform Policy of 1978 in China, urbanisation has occurred at an unprecedented rate, increasing from 17.88% in 1978 to 59.58% in 2018 [1]. The expected income of farmers decreases with the increase in the number of bidders and revenue loss and increases with the increase in the delaying construction fine and the probability of the bidders’ belief of winning the land during the second stage. The farmers’ expected income increases with the increase in the fine on delaying construction and decreases with the increase in the revenue loss of bidders losing during the second stage (Figs 5 and 6) because the equilibrium bidding price of the construction land quota increases and decreases with the increase in the fine and revenue loss, respectively, that is, the fine of delaying construction and repurchasing the quota at a premium from the bidder who acquires the quota but fails to obtain the land set by local governments indirectly affects the income of farmers who reclaim idle homesteads.
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