Abstract
We revisit the identity-based (ID-based) key agreement protocol due to Ryu et al. The protocol is highly efficient and suitable for real-world applications despite offering no resilience against key-compromise impersonation (K-CI). We show that the protocol is also insecure against reflection attacks. We propose a slight modification to the protocol and prove its security in a widely accepted model.
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