An Imperfect Solution to Afghan Reconciliation - An Afghan Truth Commission

Abstract

As a part of the reconstruction efforts currently taking place in Afghanistan, reconciliation has not attracted much attention from domestic actors, arguably because it would lead to a discussion about such issues as criminal liability, forgiveness and immunity, which the Afghan political elite is not ready to discuss. Focusing on four key issues that relate to truth commissions — chairmanship, mandate, compensation, and amnesty — and drawing on various truth commission models, this paper examines some of the concerns that would affect the establishment of an Afghan truth commission. It also aims to encourage discourse on the viability, suitability, and need for this commission, as an essential element in helping Afghanistan move forward. The paper draws on two case studies: Morocco and Eastern and Central Europe each of which developed a distinctive transnational justice system that was based on compromise. Morocco had a distinctive truth commission that focused on reconciliation and less about who bore the greatest responsibility for the violations during the ‘Years of Lead.’ In Eastern Europe, the post-communist governments adopted lustration laws. These laws penalized members of the communist parties whose activities amounted to human rights violations through political exclusion or suspension. In neither case was criminal prosecution an option because in Morocco it would require looking at the royal family and the role of King Hassan II while in Eastern Europe the potential class was too large and could have prevented peaceful transition.