Abstract
The idea of including a right of secession in democratic constitutions has been discussed by different political and legal theorists; however, little has been said on the matter from the point of view of democratic-republican political philosophy. This article undertakes this effort by means of a normative analysis of Quebec’s constitutional right of secession, as outlined in the Quebec Secession Reference. This analysis shows how the non-unilateral nature of this right minimises the risks for republican freedom (as non-domination) and inclusion in the Quebec secession conflict, while the fact that it is limited to a national constitutional framework dampens this achievement.
Highlights
The possibility of a constitutional right of secession in modern democracies has attracted the attention of different scholars, either to endorse it (Corlett, 1998; Jovanovic, 2007; Norman, 2003; Weinstock, 2000, 2001) or to reject it (Aronovitch, 2006; Sunstein, 1991, 2001), but up until now little analysis on the matter has been done from the point of view of democratic‐republican political philosophy
This article undertakes this analy‐ sis by trying to answer one question: To what extent can a constitutional right of secession be useful in order to minimise exclusion and domination stemming from secession political conflict in modern democracies? My answer is built upon a normative analysis of the case of Quebec, which in 1998 was granted a constitutional right of secession by the Supreme Court of Canada
These political conflicts imply a series of threats concerning exclusion and domination, and the case of Quebec shows us that a constitutional right of secession can act as a firewall against them due to its non‐unilateral nature, which largely avoids intractable debate on who is the sovereign over the territory inhab‐ ited by the permanent minority
Summary
The possibility of a constitutional right of secession in modern democracies has attracted the attention of different scholars, either to endorse it (Corlett, 1998; Jovanovic, 2007; Norman, 2003; Weinstock, 2000, 2001) or to reject it (Aronovitch, 2006; Sunstein, 1991, 2001), but up until now little analysis on the matter has been done from the point of view of democratic‐republican political philosophy. I think that secession conflicts must be understood as the ultimate expression of centre‐ periphery conflict, in which permanent majorities and permanent minorities disagree and fight over how the state should be conceived and organised in terms of econ‐ omy, territory, and identity These political conflicts imply a series of threats concerning exclusion and domination, and the case of Quebec shows us that a constitutional right of secession can act as a firewall against them due to its non‐unilateral nature, which largely avoids intractable debate on who is the sovereign over the territory inhab‐ ited by the permanent minority. I will present this analysis in the following five sec‐ tions: an outline of the theoretical and methodolog‐ ical framework employed; a description both of the Quebec Secession Reference (here referred to by Reference) and the constitutional right of secession it outlines; an account of its strengths in terms of minimis‐ ing domination and exclusion in the Quebec secession conflict; a critique in the opposite direction, highlight‐ ing the unresolved issues that undermine its strengths, Politics and Governance, 2021, Volume 9, Issue 4, Pages 475–482 and of the Reference’s failure to designate an arbiter for a potential non‐unilateral secession process; and a summary of my conclusions
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