An ICN Cache Pricing Mechanism Based on Non-cooperative Game Model of Users and Advertisers

Abstract

To address the problems in end-to-end networks, researchers have proposed an information-centric network(ICN). In-network caching is one of the important features of ICN, which can greatly improve the efficiency of content distribution. However, the Internet Service Providers(ISP) only deploy Innetwork caching if there is some financial incentives. The existing ICN pricing mechanisms only study paid content but ignore free content in the network. In addition, the existing ICN economic models do not take into account ISP cooperating with Content Provider(CP) to deploy in-network caches. Therefore, the pricing mechanisms already in place cannot be applied in practice. In this paper, different from the existing models which based on the paid content, a new ICN pricing model with free content based on non-cooperative game theory was proposed for the first time and advertisers were effectively added to the ICN pricing model. After analyzing the behavioral relationships between entities within the network, the authors establish the utility function for each entity. The authors analyze the impact of caching and pricing on the revenues of all entities and solve the equilibrium point to develop win-win pricing strategies. Considering the case where paid content coexists with free content in real networks, the authors proposes a more realistic and integrated model. In this paper, many experimental analyses have been conducted in addition to the theoretical analysis, and the experimental results show that the new model is closer to reality than the existing models and can provide better theoretical guidance for network pricing.