Abstract
In this paper, we propose an extensible and flexible truthful auction framework that is individual-rational and self-collusion resistant. By properly setting one simple parameter, this framework can yield efficient auctions (like VCG) and (sub)optimal auctions (like Myerson's Optimal Mechanism (MOM)) with a more computationally-efficient procedure compared to VCG and MOM; by carefully choosing virtual valuation functions for the bidders, it can produce attribute-aware auctions that take the channel diversity into consideration. The framework adopts a novel procedure that can prevent bidder self-collusion resulted from the bid diversity. Theoretical analysis and case studies demonstrate the strength of our auction framework in handling various considerations in a practical heterogeneous spectrum market.
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