Abstract
In this paper, we study price competition among multiple wireless service providers (WSPs) and propose a pricing model for such wireless oligopolies. In such oligopolies, each WSP has to compete with other WSPs for users while maximizing its profit. On the other hand, price- and congestion-sensitive users aim to maximize their compensated utilities by choosing a WSP offering the best QoS and price combination. Using a two-stage non-cooperative game model, we present a framework to formulate the interactions among the WSPs and the users and identify Nash equilibrium prices. We analyze the existence and uniqueness of equilibrium of this pricing game and characterize the relations of the WSPs' equilibrium prices. Analysis also shows that the equilibrium prices of the existing WSPs are sensitive to the entry of a new WSP.
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