An exploration of the effect of organisational demography on board size and leadership structure: Evidence from the Greek manufacturing sector

Dimitrios N Koufopoulos,Ioannis P Gkliatis

doi:10.22495/cbv14i3art4

Abstract

This study examines how organisational demography (organizational age, organisational size and number of years listed in the Athens Stock Exchange, ATHEX), may impact the board structure (board size, CEO duality and CEO dependence/ independence). The relationships are proposed, under the light of data collected from the annual reports of all 140 manufacturing organisations quoted in the Athens Stock Exchange. Research findings revealed a significantly positive relationship of organisational size, organisational age and number of years that a firm is listed in the Stock Exchange with board size. However, these organisational characteristics do not influence the leadership structure or dependency/independency of the Chairperson to the CEO. While many studies examining the impact of board characteristics on various organisational outputs, including performance, reputation and effectiveness, there are limited studies investigating variables that affect board characteristics and as such the study opens discussion on potential predictors of board.

Highlights

The crash of tech stocks in the late 1990s, the big UK’s overhaul of Corporate Governance in 2003, the proliferation of corporate scandals in the last couple decades and the global financial crisis in 2008 have made corporate governance an attractive field for professionals, regulators practitioners and academics (Lazarri et al, 2001; The McKinsey Quarterly, 2007; Bartram & Bodnar, 2009)
This study examines how organisational demography, may impact the board structure
This study aimed to examine the effects of organisational characteristics on board attributes based on a sample of Greek manufacturing firms

Summary

Introduction

The crash of tech stocks in the late 1990s, the big UK’s overhaul of Corporate Governance in 2003, the proliferation of corporate scandals in the last couple decades and the global financial crisis in 2008 have made corporate governance an attractive field for professionals, regulators practitioners and academics (Lazarri et al, 2001; The McKinsey Quarterly, 2007; Bartram & Bodnar, 2009). These events do not seem to find an end, as even with the increased publicity and the constant update of the corporate governance codes globally, serious corporate scandals continue to emerge. It is argued that the longer an organisation is listed in a stock exchange the higher the pressure for the independence of the chairman as various corporate governance codes recommend

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