Abstract
This paper reports an experiment based on the model of bilateral sequential bargaining over the distribution of a certain value in a laboratory setting within a real specific context of property development in the Netherlands. We have involved only property development professionals as participants in the experiment who have experience with the context. We have also extended the experiment into three different negotiation games distinguished by the availability of information to the participants: a negotiation game with incomplete information, asymmetric information, and complete information. We have found in this experiment that the availability of information could affect the plausibility to reach an agreement, particularly due to a restricted communication setting. This study also provides evidences that it is in the negotiators’ concern to reach an agreement with a fair outcome, which is defined here as the equilibrium, regardless the availability of the information to them.
Highlights
It has been well-acknowledged that the practice of property or land and real estate development almost always involves negotiation processes, for instance between a municipality and a private developer, between a municipality or a private developer and a landowner, between a private developer and an institutional investor, et cetera. (Healey et al 1995; Ennis 1997; Urbanavičienė et al 2009a)
This paper has reported an experiment about three different two-person bargaining processes in which different levels of financial information availability are used as stimuli in a laboratory setting
Specific contexts together with specific subjects were used in the experiment in order to give us a possibility to observe the bargaining process in land and property development, regarding value capturing for public infrastructure provision
Summary
It has been well-acknowledged that the practice of property or land and real estate development almost always involves negotiation processes, for instance between a municipality and a private developer, between a municipality or a private developer and a landowner, between a private developer and an institutional investor, et cetera. (Healey et al 1995; Ennis 1997; Urbanavičienė et al 2009a). A successful negotiation, including bargaining and making a compromise among stakeholders involved, clearly plays a crucial role in urban planning in general and to attain a successful land and real estate development project in particular. The study of negotiations as a bargaining process has received much attention in different fields of disciplines. The literature on negotiation and bargaining in the field of urban planning and land and real estate development is extensive Ennis 1997; Farthing, Ashley 2002; Ruming 2009; Urbanavičienė et al 2009b), experimental studies of negotiation and bargaining in this field are almost absent (with, a few notable exceptions, including Black, Diaz 1996; Arentze, Timmermans 2003). The lack of attention to experimental approaches in negotiation analysis related to urban planning and land
Sign-in/Register to view highlights & summary Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callMore From: International Journal of Strategic Property Management
Disclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
