Abstract
An effective way to detect the presence of a spoofing attack is to verify Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) data with measurements from other sensors, such as inertial navigation systems (INSs). In this article, uncoupled GNSS/INS-verification approaches are experimentally evaluated in an automotive context. The approaches are uncoupled in the sense that GNSS and INS sensors are operated independently without an exchange of information. The techniques considered are the magnitude verification (MAV) technique, where the acceleration and angular velocity magnitudes are compared, and the horizontal components (HoCs)-verification strategy, which requires the vertical alignment of GNSS and INS sensor frames. The analysis shows the effectiveness of these types of procedures and discusses their limitations; for example, in low-dynamic conditions, when low accelerations and angular velocities are recorded. Possible enhancements are also discussed.
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