Abstract
Three public good mechanisms, all sharing the characteristics of collective excludability, unanimity and budget balance, are compared: The mechanisms differ in ways that are hypothesized to effect free-riding behavior with the Auction mechanism expected to show the least, and the Free-Rider and Quasi Free-Rider mechanisms showing the greatest such behavior. All three mechanisms yield mean quantities of a public good that are significantly greater than the free-rider quantity. However, the Auction mechanism provides a mean quantity of the public good which is significantly larger than that of the other two procedures, and closer to the Lindahl optimal quantity.
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