Abstract
This paper examines the recently deregulated Irish electricity market. We ask: given this newly imposed institutional structure, does the availability of true marginal prices for electricity products affect the price/quantity bids submitted by market participants? First, we analyse the price movements within this market since 2007 to produce a model which best describes the data. Second, we test the auction design of the electricity markets experimentally. The current auction design is a static bidding framework. We find that if the auction were to operate under a sequential bidding auction, all market participants would benefit, as lower clearing prices would result.
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