Abstract
Coordination games provide ubiquitous interaction paradigms to frame human behavioral features, such as information transmission, conventions and languages as well as socio-economic processes and institutions. By using a dynamical approach, such as Evolutionary Game Theory (EGT), one is able to follow, in detail, the self-organization process by which a population of individuals coordinates into a given behavior. Real socio-economic scenarios, however, often involve the interaction between multiple co-evolving sectors, with specific options of their own, that call for generalized and more sophisticated mathematical frameworks. In this paper, we explore a general EGT approach to deal with coordination dynamics in which individuals from multiple sectors interact. Starting from a two-sector, consumer/producer scenario, we investigate the effects of including a third co-evolving sector that we call public. We explore the changes in the self-organization process of all sectors, given the feedback that this new sector imparts on the other two.
Highlights
Coordination games are pervasive in social interactions
By resorting to stability theory and by taking advantage of the fact that we are dealing with coordination dynamics, we focus on the characterization of the ensuing equilibria, putting emphasis on the qualitative changes that the new sector introduces, using the previous two-sector coordination dynamics as a reference
We show that the new sector can promote or prevent the self-organization of producers/consumers into the socially desirable equilibria, which naturally depends on the mechanisms employed by the public and on the subtle reward that producers/consumers may feedback into the public sector
Summary
Coordination games are pervasive in social interactions. It is argued that coordination games are the cornerstone of our institutions and the so-called social contract [1]. Without any kind of top-down control, and only resorting to simple local imitation of successful behaviors, a population of boat riders—initially composed by those who row and those who avoid it—will self-organize into an homogenous state with everyone rowing or everyone keeping quiet This dynamical approach is intimately related to the study of complex adaptive systems [16,22,23]. Evolutionary game theory, applied to the study of interdependent sectors of society, can help to understand the conditions that explain the status-quo, as well as unfold possible future equilibrium states It can be instrumental in helping one devise necessary measures and/or actions to be taken in order to promote the shift towards alternative equilibrium states, in some sense more desirable. We show that the new sector can promote or prevent the self-organization of producers/consumers into the socially desirable equilibria, which naturally depends on the mechanisms employed by the public and on the subtle reward that producers/consumers may feedback into the public sector
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