An evolutionary game-theoretic approach for investigating the long-term behavior of the industry sector for purchasing renewable and non-renewable energy: A case study of Iran

Abstract

Industrial sustainability has become increasingly important in manufacturing industries, especially those with high energy consumption. One of the strategies for achieving cleaner production in energy-intensive industries involves the utilization of renewable energy in lieu of conventional energy. Therefore, our study explores the evolutionary behavior of the population of manufacturing industries, particularly energy-intensive producers, to purchase renewable or non-renewable energy under the government's price-discount support. Thus, an evolutionary game for examining producers' behavior under two strategies of purchasing energy from a renewable supplier (R Strategy) and a non-renewable supplier (N Strategy) is considered. The analysis is conducted using data from the cement and steel industries in Iran as case studies. The results indicate that the government's support plays a vital role in changing producers' strategy toward purchasing renewable energy. Also, to change the behavior of industries toward R strategy in a shorter period, the government can support energy-intensive industries like steel manufacturers. These producers can be considered as leading manufacturing industries for transitioning to clean energy and sustainable development.