Abstract
In this paper we investigate the evolutionary dynamics of strategic behavior in the game of poker by means of data gathered from a large number of real world poker games. We perform this study from an evolutionary game theoretic perspective using two Replicator Dynamics models. First we consider the basic selection model on this data, secondly we use a model which includes both selection and mutation. We investigate the dynamic properties by studying how rational players switch between different strategies under different circumstances, what the basins of attraction of the equilibria look like, and what the stability properties of the attractors are. We illustrate the dynamics using a simplex analysis. Our experimental results confirm existing domain knowledge of the game, namely that certain strategies are clearly inferior while others can be successful given certain game conditions.
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