An evolutionary game model of manufacturers and consumers’ behavior strategies for green technology and government subsidy in supply chain platform

Abstract

With an increasing emphasis on sustainability and environmental conservation in recent years, a discernible global paradigm shift has occurred. This transformation has engendered a heightened interest in advancing the adoption and integration of green technologies across a spectrum of sectors, including supply chains. The main objective of this research is to analyze how stakeholder participation in the adoption of environmentally friendly practices can be strengthened in an appropriate platform supply chain environment. Firstly, this paper considers the impact of government subsidies and green technology investment on manufacturers, the government, and consumers in the supply chain market model. Secondly, a three-party evolutionary game model is constructed for the government, manufacturers, and consumers, and the equilibrium results are analyzed. In order to further uncover the factors influencing the cooperation of these parties, we conducted sensitivity analyses on two parameters: government subsidies and government subsidies for consumers to purchase green products. The principal findings can be summarized as follows: (1) Government subsidies wield a positive influence on the behavioral strategies of the three entities, motivating manufacturers to invest in green technology and propelling consumers towards the adoption of green products. (2) In comparison to direct subsidies bestowed upon manufacturers, an amplification of government subsidies for consumers exerts a more profound impact in spurring manufacturers to invest in green technology. These insights also furnish a deeper understanding of the decision-making mechanisms employed by stakeholders within the green supply chain.