An Evolutionary Game Analysis on Green Technological Innovation of New Energy Enterprises under the Heterogeneous Environmental Regulation Perspective

Abstract

In the context of economic transformation and upgrading and ecological civilization construction, green technology innovation is an inevitable choice for enterprises’ sustainable development. Can environmental regulation effectively promote enterprises’ green technological innovation and achieve a win–win economic growth and environmental protection situation? This paper uses evolutionary game theory and numerical simulation to analyze the influence mechanisms of command-control, market-incentive and social-will, three environmental regulation tools and different combinations of environmental regulation tools on green technology innovation behavior of new energy enterprises. The study found: (1) The effects of three types of environmental regulation tools on green technological innovation of new energy enterprises are different, in which market-incentive environmental regulation policies play the most significant role, followed by command-control environmental regulation and social-will environmental regulation tools are not very obvious. (2) Implementing a separate environmental regulation policy has a poor effect on stimulating green technology innovation of new energy enterprises. If two environmental regulation means are implemented, the combination of command-control and market-incentive environmental regulations is the most effective. (3) Combining the implementation of three environmental regulation means of high-intensity market-incentive, high-intensity command-control and low-intensity social-will is the best strategy combination, which can motivate new energy enterprises to become stable for the green technology innovation strategy in the shortest time.