An evolutionary analysis on the effect of tax incentives on R & D diffusion of wind power industry in complex network

Abstract

The innovation performance of Chinese wind power enterprises has not been effectively improved, which may be caused by the behavior of enterprises using the information asymmetry between government and enterprises to camouflage R & D and obtain policies incentives. Therefore, this paper attempts to construct an evolutionary game model of tax incentives in complex network, introduces technology spillover and reputation cost, and discusses the diffusion of R & D in Chinese wind power industry. The results show that: (1) Reducing technology spillover not only contributes to the R & D diffusion, but also reduces the peak in the proportion of enterprises with camouflaging R & D. (2) Increasing reputation cost of violations can accelerate enterprises to reach the equilibrium and reduce the time that the proportion of the behavior with camouflaging R & D decreases. (3) The increase in incentives of lower tax rate for high-tech enterprises will create “lowland effect” for high-tech enterprises. And the increase in incentives of extra deduction for R & D expenses will increase the R & D diffusion of non-high-tech enterprises, while also suppressing the peak of the proportion in non-high-tech enterprises with camouflaging R & D.