An Event-Driven Resilient Control Strategy for DC Microgrids

Abstract

Though recent advancements in dc microgrids are largely based on distributed control strategies to enhance reliability, their susceptibility to cyber attacks still remains a challenging issue. Additionally in converter-dominated dc microgrids, mitigation of cyber attacks upon detection in a timely manner is the need of the hour to prevent the system from immediate shutdown. Since most of the existing research is primarily focused on the detection of cyber attacks in dc microgrids without giving prior attention to comprehensive steps of mitigation, this article classifies cyber attacks as events and introduces an event-driven cyber attack resilient strategy for dc microgrids, which immediately replaces the attacked signal with a trusted event-driven signal constructed using True transmitted measurements. This mechanism not only disengages the attack element from the control system, but also replaces it with an event-triggered estimated value to encompass normal consensus operation during both steady state as well as transient conditions even in the presence of attacks. Finally, the event detection criteria and its sensitivity are theoretically verified and validated using simulation and experimental conditions in the presence of both stealth voltage and current attacks.