Abstract
In this paper, residue number system (RNS) based logic is proposed as a protection against power side-channel attacks. Every input to RNS logic is encrypted as a share of the original input in the residue domain through modulus values. Most existing countermeasures enhance side-channel privacy by making the power trace statistically indistinguishable. The proposed RNS logic provides cryptographic privacy that also offers side-channel resistance. It also offers side-channel privacy by mapping different input bit values into similar bit encodings for the shares. This property is also captured as a symmetry measure in the paper. This side-channel resistance of the RNS secure logic is evaluated analytically and empirically. An analytical metric is developed to capture the conditional probability of the input bit state given the residue state visible to the adversary, but derived from hidden cryptographic secrets. The transition probability, normalized variance, and Kullback–Leibler (KL) divergence serve as side-channel metrics. The results show that our RNS secure logic provides better resistance against high-order side-channel attacks both in terms of power distribution uniformity and success rates of machine learning (ML)-based power side-channel attacks. We performed SPICE simulations on Montgomery modular multiplication and Arithmetic-style modular multiplication using the FreePDK 45 nm Technology library. The simulation results show that the side-channel security metrics using KL divergence are 0.0204 for Montgomery and 0.0020 for the Arithmetic-style implementation. This means that Arithmetic-style implementation has better side-channel resistance than the Montgomery implementation. In addition, we evaluated the security of the AES encryption with RNS secure logic on a Spartan-6 FPGA Board. Experimental results show that the protected AES circuit offers 79% higher resistance compared to the unprotected AES circuit.
Highlights
Side-channel attacks (SCA) are hardware cryptanalytic techniques used to reveal a secret data value, such as a key embedded into an algorithm by exploiting the implementation vulnerabilities
Internet of Things (IoT) nodes in a cyber-physical system are attractive targets for physical side-channel attacks
This paper has presented a novel logic design style based on residue number systems that offer increased resistance to power side-channel attacks
Summary
Side-channel attacks (SCA) are hardware cryptanalytic techniques used to reveal a secret data value, such as a key embedded into an algorithm by exploiting the implementation vulnerabilities. When a secret is revealed through a strong correlation between power samples and the secret data value, we consider it to be a loss of side-channel privacy. Most of the known techniques target side-channel privacy. Residue number systems (RNS) allow one to create multiple shares of a secret. Each of these shares can be computed independently. The resulting shares can be combined into a single result This is akin to the traditional multiparty computation. Any homomorphic multiparty computation technique can be used within the context of this paper. Many hardware implementation optimizations of RNS systems exist, making it more suitable for this research
Sign-in/Register to view highlights & summary Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Free) 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a call
