Abstract
A typical human person has privileged epistemic access to its identity over time in virtue of having a first-person point of view. In explaining this phenomenon in terms of an intimate relation of self-attribution or the like, I infer that a typical human person has direct consciousness of itself through inner awareness or personal memory. Direct consciousness of oneself is consciousness of oneself, but not by consciousness of something else. Yet, a perduring human person, Sp, i.e., a human person with temporal parts, is identical with the complete series of its temporal parts. I argue that because Sp is diverse from any incomplete series of its Sp cannot be conscious of all of its temporal parts through inner awareness or personal memory, Sp cannot have direct consciousness of itself. I conclude that a human person endures, i.e., wholly exists at each of the times it exists.
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