Abstract
How do civilians respond to violence in civil war, and how do these responses shape combatants’ coercive strategies? Conventional wisdom expects civilian victimization to backfire, as a security-minded public “balances” against the side posing the greatest threat to its livelihood and survival. Yet combatants often expect a terrorized population to do the opposite, “bandwagoning” with those most willing and capable to inflict harm. Using an epidemic model of popular support dynamics, I explore the logic of balancing and bandwagoning in irregular civil war. I argue that when civilian strategy is clearly communicated to combatants, civilians are always better off balancing, and combatants are better off avoiding punishment. When civilian choice is not observed, the balancing equilibrium breaks down and patterns of violence depend on the local balance of power. The model’s results challenge the view that selective violence is most common in areas of incomplete control. Due to uncertainty over civilian behavior, violence in both divided and perfectly controlled areas can occur in equilibrium, inflicting great costs on civilians. I compare these predictions against the historical record of Soviet counterinsurgency in Western Ukraine, using new micro-level data from the declassified archives of the Soviet secret police.
Highlights
How do civilians respond to violence in civil war, and how do these responses shape combatants’ coercive strategies? Conventional wisdom expects civilian victimization to backfire, as a security-minded public “balances” against the side posing the greatest threat to its livelihood and survival
How do civilians respond to violence in civil war, and how do these responses shape combatants’ coercive strategies? Irregular intrastate war typically involves a violent competition for the support of the population
The preceding analysis explored the logic behind two responses to civil war violence: balancing against the side that inflicts the most costs, and bandwagoning with it
Summary
Imagine a hypothetical conflict zone with three sets of actors: civilians, insurgents and the government. Violence remains selective by intent, but its targets are selected inaccurately in practice (Kalyvas, 2006, 189) In this atmosphere of uncertainty, the two combatants must decide on an optimal level of force, while accounting for their inability to fully control how accurate their use of selective violence will be. Violence in partially-controlled areas is expected to be common; in divided and fully-controlled areas, it is off the equilibrium path These predictions rest on the assumption that rational civilians balance rather than bandwagon: “everything else being equal, most people prefer to collaborate with the political actor that best guarantees their survival” (Kalyvas, 2008b, 406).
Sign-in/Register to view highlights & summary Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Free) 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a call
